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ISLANDS: The spatial politics of soccer. 









Introduction: a tale of global times 
The last two decades have made abundantly clear that the challenge of urbanism is no longer about 
the physical image of cities but rather about the immense effect that invisible forces have on actual 
territories. In dissecting this shift, the definitions of territory, media, and representation of these 
phenomena will all have to be questioned. 
Paradoxically the urgency of these questions is more evident when we look at urbanism through less 
obvious fields; for instance, sport – more precisely soccer – can turn out to be a surprisingly effective 
device to understand the present condition.  
This piece recounts the short-lived trajectory of G14 – a private lobby of prestigious European soccer 









Urbanism as we know it has come to an end; the definition of what constitute urban agglomerates is 
an increasingly more slippery and vaguer enterprise. For instance, whether these spaces exist in the 
physical or digital realm – think of Second Life – bears little consequences over their legitimacy.   
As urban environments manifest in unconventional forms, their architecture is no longer just made of 
buildings and roads, but also include protocols and action plans. This type of urbanism is mostly 
invisible but no less powerful. Its tools are law, economy, and politics; it organises vast regions 
without ever being visible.  
In these territories architects have far more to learn than teach. They have been tremendously slow in 
recording these mutations and do not really have adequate tools to grasp them either. The current 
disciplinary toolbox is destined to radically change; urbanism will be less in the hand of so-called 




Similarly, the role of the media in this transformation will be essential.  
The point of reference here is the crisis newspapers are traversing. Faster and portable digital media 
guarantee real-time access to events regardless of their geographical scale; something newspapers 
simply cannot keep up with. However this insurmountable gap between the two media should not be 
perceived as a limitation but rather as an opportunity to operate more as curators. Newspapers and 
urbanists’ role can thus be more about decoding information, filtering it, and shift the pace at which 
events are consumed. This slowness can be instrumental in unravelling the latent network of 
connections contained in actual events; thus, building a bridge between the physical presence and the 
invisible network of forces shaping it. 
 
Invisible 
The kind of research on networks we advocate often presents to the observer like icebergs do: only 
an infinitesimal portion of their shape is actually visible; what at first glance appears trivial can 
actually unearth substantial discoveries. Thus, sport too can be a source of exploration and learning 
for urbanists. Particularly, the way in which soccer has been expanding on and altering the European 
territory outlines some interesting paradigms for our contemporary condition. 
The fact that high-profile architects have been commissioned large stadiums and sport arenas is 
perhaps just the final effect of a phenomenon of much more radical and broader implications. It is the 
political and economic network supporting soccer that has changed and enabled such grandiose 




Why should we then focus on soccer in Europe rather than other sports? The relation between sport 
and market economy is certainly nothing new and has been a core tenet of the global popularity of 
disciplines such as golf and Formula 1 racing.  
These sport events and their media circus are travelling machines that move from place to place 
without integrating with or understanding local conditions; art biennales and G8/G20 summits are 
analogue examples in other fields. As such, these are typically contemporary phenomena; they 
materialise the economical and political consequences of technological developments of digital 
capitalism. They act as indicators of the strengths, weaknesses, and peculiarities of capital. 
European soccer, though, provides a more complex and, at times, less successful story; its position is 
still trapped between its deeply rooted history and the more recent promise of world-wide expansion.  
Similar to the recent economic crisis, G14 – like banks – sought expansion through other types of 
currencies, whose flexibility could easily be manipulated by various, and often dubious, agendas. 
However, the actual football community –let’s call it ‘the real’ – constituted a form of friction that 
constantly interfered with the G14’s smooth plans.  It is by now a well-known cliché that for European 
fans soccer is far more than ‘just’ a sport and actually represents a platform through which history, 
geography, and social classes can manifest themselves. If the marketing gurus behind the major 
European clubs considered this situation an old-fashion burden to supplant, the tension between 
traditional values (history, place, etc.) and emerging ones (globalisation, image-based culture, etc.) 
was indicative of the politics at stake. In fact, this friction was instrumental to unmask some of the 
rhetoric behind the arguments of both those who stubbornly protect local interests and those who 
think that globalisation is a sort of wax to lubricate contradictions.  
 
Islands 
Between 2000 and 2008 G14 produced its own version of Europe
1
. Rather than a complex continent 
formed by fifty countries and characterised by great cultural diversity, the organisations’ version was 
a rather simpler but perhaps a more contemporary one. Fourteen soccer clubs
2
 self-proclaimed to be 
the voice of the entire continent and turned thus Europe into a constellation formed by only fourteen 
networked dots. Reminiscent of political organisations such as the G8, G14 relied on the idea that few 
powerful clubs could represent the many not-so-powerful ones. 
Among other things, the association aimed at replacing old, superseded organisations – such as UEFA 
was in G14’s vision– to provide a more agile, up-to-date model suitable to the raise of global soccer.   
Like European uber-capitals such as London or Paris, these clubs were in close dialogue with each 
other – regardless of the actual geographical position – but had no actual relation with the territory 
that was immediately surrounding them. They were de facto islands as they had adopted the typical 
double movement characterising the constitution of archipelagos: first separation from whatever 





The story of the G14 is a typical one in pre-crisis Europe. The widening schism between actual 
territories and their forms of governance allowed pliable and deregulated organisations to prosper. 
Digital technology played a part in this process: its pervasiveness and extreme flexibility well 
supported the laissez-faire attitude toward societal structures. The gap between those represented 
and organs supposed to represent them also produced puzzling results: what mechanism legitimated 




It is not a coincidence that journalists had troubles to detect a rationale behind the choice of clubs: in 
fact the richest – Chelsea – and the most popular – Benfica – were both absent. Moreover, PSG, 
Marseille, and Bayern Leverkusen – also part of the group – had only sporadically been at the top of 
European ranks.  
In august 2002, four new members extended the organisation to eighteen clubs: despite numerous 
speculations about a further increase in the number of adhering members, G14 remained unaltered 
until its dissolution on 15 February 2008. The admission process was also at odds with supposed 
inclusiveness of the group; new clubs could only join by unanimous invitation of the members.a 
 
The ultimate G14’s plan was in fact to supersede Uefa and start an independent league only 
comprising its members.  It is at this point that the organisation’s frictionless vision of Europe was 
muddled and ultimately brought on its knees by supposedly old-fashion concerns.  
A league with a fixed number of teams implied the same matches every year: the expectations 
created by games that could potentially only happen once a decade would have been spoiled by 
uninterrupted availability. The fans themselves decreed the end of the project: G14 could not fully 
disentangle itself from geography or history to enter the hyper-world of techno-capital.   
Founded to increase spectacle in the football, G14 achieved the opposite result: it was deemed 
predictable and boring. Also, the G14’s positivistic claims to be more flexible and malleable than 
                                                 
1
 for further information of the G14, see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G-14 
2
 The list of the founding members is: Barcelona (Spain), Real Madrid (Spain), Liverpool (England), Manchester 
United (England), Juventus (Italy), Milan (Italy), Internazionale (Italy), Marseille (France), Paris Saint-Germain 
(France), Bayern Munich (Germany), Borussia Dortmund (Germany), Ajax (Netherlands), PSV (Netherlands), Porto 
(Portugal). In 2002 Arsenal (England), Lyon (France), Bayer Leverkusen (Germany), Valencia (Spain) also joint G14.  
 
3
 ‘The Voice of the Clubs’ was the organisation’s motto. 
existing organisations turned out to actually tame difference through generic and repetitive formats. 
Like in Dubai’s urbanism, relentless difference actually gives rise to its opposite: sameness. 
 
In times of crisis and structural re-thinking, storytelling can be a fruitful approach to urbanism. Rather 
than focusing on disciplinary problems, narrative accounts can concentrate on peripheral, seemingly 
meaningless facts; whether describing ordinary or extreme conditions, these facts do require 
architects and urbanists to learn how to detect and decipher them before any action is taken. 
 
